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
MORNING MEETING - 29 January 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

1. Iran. Bakhtiar says the airports will be open today and Khomeini can come back if he wants, but there are "questions of security." Khomeini says he will return tonight. The military have not yet been heard from. If Khomeini does not come back, his entourage says he will declare Jihad, but my own view is that he is more likely to continue undercutting Bakhtiar from below. If Khomeini does return, the situation will be even more chaotic with two rival governments in Tehran. It is difficult for me to see how civil war can then be avoided, if indeed Khomeini remains as unwilling to compromise as he has so far.

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MORNING MEETING - 26 January 1978

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I briefed on the likelihood of violence in Tehran as Bakhtiar takes a harder line and Khomeini does not compromise; the possibility that Khomeini may decide not to attempt a return at this point but to use the same tactics that brought down the last three prime ministers and the Shah.

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MORNING MEETING - 24 January 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I briefed on the approach of a new climax in Iran, the problems associated with Khomeini's return, and the lack of any direct knowledge of Khomeini's intentions. I emphasized that we had seen no indication of willingness to compromise on his part and that optimism that an arrangement might be worked out was unjustified.



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MORNING MEETING - 22 January 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

1. I simply noted that people in Iran had not gone back to work and this would not bode well for the longevity of the Bakhtiar government.

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MORNING MEETING - 17 January 1979

The Director was in the chair.

1. I briefed only on the possible implications of Brezhnev's unexpected departure from Sofia. I suggested that if there was a policy issue that called him back, it was most likely to be relations with China.

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MORNING MEETING - 15 January 1979

The DDCI was in the chair.

1. I briefed on Iran and the plan for the Shah's departure. I cautioned that it was by no means sure that Parliament would confirm the Bakhtiar government given Khomeini's opposition. I also mentioned the concern [redacted] on the explosive nature of present economic conditions with Poland.

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MORNING MEETING - 8 January 1979

Mr. Blake was in the chair.

1. I briefed on the situation in Indochina making the point that the Vietnamese were moving very rapidly and probably attempting to forestall reversion to guerrilla warfare by the Cambodians. I emphasized that no Cambodian government supported by the Vietnamese could be successful. The Chinese continue preparations to move, [REDACTED] They may be seeking some sort of mandate from the UN Security Council.

2. On Iran, I said it was even more clear that Bakhtiar would not succeed. All the opposition had to do was to continue its present pressure techniques for him to fail. There was no indication that the Shah was really willing to give.

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MORNING MEETING - 3 January 1979

Mr. Blake was in the chair.

1. I briefed on the Iranian situation making the point that Bakhtiar would probably not be able to form an effective government, even if the Shah leaves, that the present senior military would be likely to follow the Shah into exile, and that one should look for the unknown colonel as the man in the military to strike a deal with Khomeini.
2. I also discussed the additional developments in the Vietnam-Kampuchea-Chinese situation, calling attention to the steady movement of this situation toward a Sino-Soviet confrontation.
3. I noted our advance word that Haig would announce his retirement.

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MORNING MEETING - 2 January 1979

The DCI was in the chair.

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1. I briefed on the [redacted] situation in Cambodia and the state of Chinese reaction thereto.

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